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On January 26-31, 1980, the National Moot Competition was held
in New York City, New York. Over 160 law schools from across the
United States entered the competition. The Chicago-Kent College of
Law Moot Court Society team won the best brief award and placed
third in the oral argument competition. Chicago-Kent Law Review is
pleased to present the winner of the Best Brief Award of the 1980 National Moot Court Competition.*
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
MICRO WONDER, INC v. ENVIRONMENTAL GENETICS
L4BORATORIES, INC
QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

Whether the court of appeals was correct in holding that the facts
and issues exceeded the comprehension of a jury?
II. Whether a bench trial is necessary to provide a reasoned verdict?
III. Whether the seventh amendment requires a jury trial in cases
where the issues are too complex for jurors to comprehend?
IV. Whether due process requires denial of a jury trial when a case is
so complex as to exceed the capacity of any jury to understand the
issues?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent, Environmental Genetics Laboratories, Inc., ("EnGen"), was formed in 1968 to conduct research in the field of genetic
engineering. En-Gen is a not-for-profit corporation funded in part by
the government and in part by private foundations and environmental
organizations. Petitioner, MicroWonder, Inc., ("MicroWonder"), is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Richesse Oil Company. Recently, both
corporations have been engaged in developing microorganisms for use
in cleaning up oil spills.
In 1970, employees of MicroWonder, including Dr. Helen L. Toohey, genetically modified a microorganism through the incorporation
of extrachromosomal elements known as plasmids into a single cell.
The modified cell, which would degrade hydrocarbons such as crude
oil, had a plurality of different plasmids and was allegedly different
* Note: The title page, index, and table of cases have been omitted. References to the trial
record have been deleted from the original brief.
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from any cell which existed previously. Prior to 1970, various single
bacterial strains existed which degraded single components of oil, but
none degraded more than one component of oil. A patent was filed for
this microorganism on June 8, 1972.
In early 1971, Dr. Toohey, in disputed circumstances, left the employ of MicroWonder to become director of the En-Gen staff. In May
1972, En-Gen began to market "know how" licenses for the production
of a microorganism which degraded not only oil but also detergents.
This remarkable new product could be used to clean detergents as well
as oil waste from rivers and streams. En-Gen did not seek a patent and
priced its product under a formula calculated only to recover development costs.
MicroWonder filed suit against En-Gen for patent infringement.
Other counts sought damages for the appropriation of MicroWonder's
trade secrets, unfair competition, and wrongful interference with contractual relationships.
In its complaint, MicroWonder asserted that En-Gen's product infringed claim 7 of MicroWonder's patent, which reads: "A bacterium
from the genus Pseudomas [sic] containing therein at least two stable
energy-generating plasmids, each of said plasmids providing a separate
hydrocarbon degradative pathway."
En-Gen's bacterium contains three energy-generating plasmids,
one of which degrades hydrocarbons, while the remaining two plasmids degrade detergent. MicroWonder has data which allegedly demonstrates that En-Gen's product is within the scope of MicroWonder's
patent.
En-Gen asserted that the patent was invalid because: (1) the
claimed invention was first conceived in En-Gen's laboratory, not
MicroWonder's; (2) even if MicroWonder was the first to conceive,
they did not diligently reduce the invention to practice (but withheld it
with the intent to increase the price); and (3) En-Gen's reduction to
practice preceded that of MicroWonder. En-Gen further claimed that
MicroWonder's invention was "obvious" in view of the prior art and
therefore not patentable.
As trial approached, En-Gen became increasingly conscious of the
difficulty of trying this case to a jury, as demanded by MicroWonder.
The great technical difficulty and complexity of the case necessitated
that En-Gen's counsel for the trial take evening classes in biochemistry
and molecular biology in order to discuss intelligently the issues. EnGen was forced to retain a Ph.D. in molecular biochemistry to assist
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the attorneys in discovery. Since an understanding of sophisticated scientific concepts was absolutely essential to En-Gen's defense, En-Gen
conscientiously developed techniques to try to enable the jury to understand the case. A Techniques of Civil Advocacy Program ("T-CAP")
team of jury specialists worked with trial counsel in developing techniques to aid the jury. The trial judge accepted all of the innovative
suggestions of the T-CAP team, which included: three "teaching witnesses," interim charges to instruct the jury, depositions in chronological order, personal notebooks for the jury, a copy of the 342 page
Stipulation of Facts for each juror, and daily review of the transcripts.
Shortly before trial commenced, En-Gen and MicroWonder cooperated in obtaining jury profiles. Despite the existence of a fair crosssection of the community in the venire, the attrition of the jury selection process produced a jury largely lacking in technical training or
advanced education. Due to the lengthy trial, twenty-five jurors were
excused for hardship, including twelve with technology-related jobs.
Moreover, twelve jurors were excused for cause and three jurors with
college educations were excused because of plaintiffs peremptory challenges. Of the six chosen jurors and two alternates, only one had any
education beyond high school, four were not employed, and none had
any technical training. The employed jurors included a postal clerk, a
shoe sales clerk, a school teacher (alternate), and a bank teller (alternate).
Trial commenced before Judge Wall of the Eastern District of
Krypton. The jury sat for ninety-six days of trial, over six months'
time. The trial record was over 26,500 pages long and over 25,000 documents were admitted into evidence. Eighty-five witnesses testified, including two former Nobel Prize winners who gave opposing testimony.
Numerous issues within the trial were of great complexity. The
controversy as to the dates of first conception and first reduction to
practice required testimony of what took place in the laboratories of
both parties over a three-year period. The issue of "obviousness" required extensive testimony as to the scope and content of the prior art.
Additional evidence was presented as to the "diligence" issue, the commercial success of MicroWonder's product, the circumstances surrounding the contracts for 150 licenses of En-Gen's product, and
numerous other issues.
At the close of the trial, the court, exercising its discretion under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b), submitted the case to the jury under a general
verdict accompanied by 105 interrogatories. The interrogatories in-
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cluded such essential questions as the biochemical compositions of the
two inventions, the dates on which each invention was conceived, and
whether plaintiffs invention was "obvious" with respect to several
points of the prior art.
After three days of deliberation, the jury returned a $158 million
verdict for the plaintiff without answering a single one of the 105 interrogatories. After a further unsuccessful attempt by the jury to answer
the questions, Judge Wall granted the defendant's motion for a mistrial.
En-Gen further moved to strike plaintiffs jury demand upon retrial, as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a). In ruling on that motion
Judge Wall noted that the "common sense" of jurors was simply not
enough to produce a decision rationally related to the facts and law.
Therefore, no jury could be expected to resolve the issues of this case.
He further commented that the extra aids available to the court under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would make the judge a much
more competent arbiter. Nevertheless, the trial judge regretfully denied En-Gen's motion because he felt that the case was a classic legal
action under the seventh amendment. However, Judge Wall certified
the question of re-trial by jury for immediate appeal to the court of
appeals.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit reversed. The court concluded that the seventh amendment does not and
never did require jury trial of issues not cognizable by a randomly selected group of lay persons. In addition, jury trial under such circumstances would clash fatally with the fifth amendment's fundamental
command of due process. Judge Katz dissented. On August 1, 1979,
the United States Supreme Court granted MicroWonder's petition for a
writ of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

There are a small number of complex and lengthy cases which
present problems of such incredible dimension that they exceed comprehension of a jury. The case at bar falls into that category. The volume of the evidence and the conceptual sophistication of the issues,
combined with the protracted trial, resulted in a case that far exceeded
the capabilities of a jury. Only a bench trial could reasonably resolve
the issues.
Removing this case from a jury's consideration is in accord with
the traditional function of equity: to take jurisdiction when the remedy
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at law was inadequate. Beginning long before 1791 and continuing to
the present day, the inability of the jury to comprehend the facts and
the issues in a case constituted an inadequate remedy at law and allowed a bench trial of the issues under equity jurisdiction.
This Court's modern seventh amendment holdings reflect the historical concern over the inadequacies of juries. Recently, the capabilities and limitations of juries have been isolated as a key factor which
would act as a limitation on the right to a jury trial. Therefore, in complex cases, the seventh amendment right to a jury trial must be determined in light of the ability of a jury to comprehend the case.
The historical relegation of complex cases to the equity courts is
highly consistent with modern concepts of fairness in litigation. The
due process clause of the fifth amendment requires courts to adjudicate
disputes in accordance with procedures designed to assure non-arbitrary decisions. A jury trial in a case presenting a fact situation that is
incomprehensible to the jury is contrary to the due process clause because an arbitrary decision will result.
The courts have never hesitated to apply the due process clause in
order to limit other constitutional provisions. The original purpose of
the jury system was to prevent arbitrary decisions and it would be a
subversion of that ideal to require a jury trial in highly complex situations such as in the case at bar.
The court of appeals correctly determined that the instant case is
beyond the practical abilities of any jury and that a retrial by the court
would ensure due process without violating the seventh amendment.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE COMBINATION OF THE FACTS, ISSUES AND LAW
OF THIS CASE EXCEEDS THE PRACTICAL
ABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF ANY JURY
A.

The Extraordinary Complexity of the Issues in This Case
Renders It Beyond the Comprehension of a Jury

Children, insane people, and those who do not speak English are
barred from jury service. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1), (3), (4) (1976). This
common sense requirement reflects the notion that people judging a
case should understand the facts and the issues. Yet, the record is clear
that the jury in the instant case was incapable of understanding the

916

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

evidence and the issues involved in the proceeding so as to form a rational and fair judgment.
Moreover, the trial of the present case would exceed the practical
abilities and limitations of any jury. Because of the legal and factual
complexities, and because the trial involved massive quantities of highly technical and scientific evidence presented over a prolonged period
of time, this case was fundamentally unsuited for trial by jury.
At trial, plaintiff MicroWonder alleged infringement of its patent,
appropriation of trade secrets, and wrongful interference with its contractual relationships. En-Gen denied these claims and asserted that
the patent was invalid because the microorganism was conceived in
En-Gen's lab, because plaintiff did not diligently reduce the invention
to practice, and because the invention was an obvious development in
view of the prior art.
To determine whether the plasmid was an obvious development,
the jury was required to pinpoint the state-of-the-art in the fields of
microbiology and biochemistry at the time En-Gen developed its product. This required a comprehension of the development of multiplasmid implantation in microorganisms. The following excerpt from one
of the documents admitted into evidence is an example of the basic
knowledge required to adequately comprehend this microbiological development.
The basic minimum requirement for a plasmid-like existence would
appear to be equipment for autonomous replication coordinated with
the division cycle of the host cell and for equitable distribution of
replicas to daughter cells. A reasonable hypothesis is that the structure of a plasmid includes a recognition site or sites for initiation or
repression of replication and a site for attachment to a structural
component of the cell (a maintenance site) through which plasmid
replication is keyed to the cell cycle and replicas are properly distributed. Diffusible substances, such as enzymes, involved in replication
could be supplied by the host or by the plasmid - different plasmid
systems may vary in this respect.
Novick, ExtrachromosomalInheritance in Bacteria, 33 Bacteriological
Reviews 210, 214 (1969).
To reach a proper conclusion on the issue of obviousness, the jurors had to understand not only the development of transmissibility of
plasmids. They also had to compare the prior art to the results of the
detailed work which transpired in plaintiffs and En-Gen's laboratories
over a three year period. Only with a working knowledge of these sophisticated scientific matters could the jury competently resolve the issue of obviousness.
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The validity of plaintiff's patent also depended on whether it proceeded diligently to reduce the invention to practice. This determination required an understanding of what actually occurred in plaintiff's
lab between the date of conception and the filing of the patent application, and what shouldhave occurred. If plaintiff did not use reasonable
diligence to reduce the invention to practice and, instead, intentionally
withheld the product to inflate its price, the patent would not be valid.
See Globe- Union, Inc. v. Chicago Telephone Supply Co., 103 F.2d 722,
730-31 (7th Cir. 1939).
If the jurors did find the patent to be valid-ie., diligence was
used in reducing the product to practice and it was not obvious in light
of the prior art-the jury still had to determine whether the patent was
infringed. This determination required the jury to decide whether the
extrachromosomal gene clusters in En-Gen's microorganism provided
single or multiple pathways for hydrocarbon degradation. The complicated theory is addressed in the following paragraph which is taken
from an article introduced into evidence:
Transductional and conjugational genetic analyses of several
degradative pathways in various species of Pseudomonas point to the
tight clustering of genes governing synthesis of an array of inducible
enzymes involved in the degradation of several complex organic
compounds. Transductional analysis shows a tight clustering of
genes specifying 10 to 12 enzymes that convert D-camphor to
isobutyrate; this genome cluster is easily cured of the cells either
spontaneously or by treatment with mitomycin C. The gene cluster
for D-camphor degradation is also transmissible among different
Pseudomonal species; this suggests that the entire pathway occurs in
nature as an extrachromosomal element responsible for the degradation of n-octane to octanoic acid. It can be cured by mitomycin C.
and can be transferred from parent P. oleovorans to octane-negative
segregants to P. oleovorans or to other octane-negative P. putilda
strains.
A. Chakrabarty & I. Gunsalas, Genetics 510 (vol. 68, No. 1 1971).
Ph.D.s spend years of intensive study to be conversant with these vital
facts. In order to prepare this case for trial, a Ph.D. in molecular biochemistry was retained by En-Gen's attorneys to decipher information
at trial depositions and to frame accurate discovery requests. Even
with this help, the attorneys had to take courses in biochemistry and
molecular biology just to converse adequately with their "go-between."
But the six untrained people deciding this matter had to attempt to
fathom the extraordinarily advanced concepts in only six months.
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B.

The Massive Dimensions of this Case Render a Jury Incapable
of Deciding It Fairly and Reliably

It would be difficult enough for any jury to understand and resolve
just one of the complex microbiological issues in the case. But the jury
was asked to perform the Herculean task of resolving many complex
issues. The difficulty of the jury's task in learning and interrelating the
complex subjects presented to it, which were vital to a proper presentment of En-Gen's case, was vastly compounded by the protracted trial.
This was, by any ordinary standard, a truly massive case. By comparison, of the 284 jury and non-jury trials concerning copyrights, patents and trademarks conducted in federal district courts during the year
ending June 30, 1977, not a single one lasted more than twenty days.
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the
Director 352 (1977). Yet, the first trial in the present case consumed
ninety-six days, four times longer than any patent case heard in 1977.
The trial of this action was truly an extraordinary undertaking.
The sheer magnitude of the evidence presented over the six month
trial only further compounded the difficulties of jury comprehension.
At trial, eighty-five witnesses gave conflicting testimony and 25,000
documents were admitted into evidence. If each page could be read in
two minutes and the jurors read for eight hours a day, it would have
taken them three months just to read each technical document once.
And, even if they read the documents, the conceptual density and the
technical complexity of the language could only leave the jurors stupefied. It would take an expert to understand such vital complex concepts
as "transduction," "conjugation," "extrachromosomal genes," and "hydrocarbon degradation."
The volume of the evidence and the conceptual sophistication of
the issues, combined with a protracted trial, resulted in a case that far
exceeded the capabilities of the jury. As Chief Justice Burger noted in
his recent speech criticizing the use of juries in complex cases, "there is
a limit to the capacity of any of us-jurors or even a judge-to understand and remember complicated transactions described in a long
trial." Remarks of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Meeting of Conference of Chief Justices, Flagstaff, Arizona (Aug. 7, 1979). Complex material barely grasped at one stage of the trial will have to be retained
over long periods of time and then recalled, if it can be, for use at other
stages. Id. Additionally, the jury will be expected to apply this complicated body of knowledge to the massive accumulation of facts and information that will be generated in a lengthy trial. "Sitting for months
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on end in a complicated civil case, a jury, no matter how well directed
by instruction from the court, cannot be expected to sustain the interest
or attention necessary even to collate the evidence, let alone to understand it." Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions
Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 208 (1976).
In the present case, the numerous witnesses, voluminous evidence,
and complexity of the issues frustrate the purpose of the jury, which is
to be a competent trier-of-fact. The constitutional model of a civil jury
is a group of citizens from all walks of life who "sit together, consult,
apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven,
and draw a unanimous conclusion." RailroadCo. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 657, 664 (1873). The civil jury functions most effectively when
the "practical experience" of the jurors in "the common affairs of life"
can be "wisely applied." Id. But in the instant case, the jurors cannot
call upon their everyday experiences to interpret the foreign language
of technologically advanced microbiology. In criminal and tort actions, the jury defines the community standard; in contract actions, the
jury relies on its own experience for a standard of judgment. Note, The
Right to an Incompetent Jury. ProtractedCommercialLitigation andthe
Seventh Amendment, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 775, 784 (1978). But a jury's
common sense and everyday experiences are irrelevant when it is asked
to decide intricate microbiological questions of the highest order. Even
co-winners of the 1976 Nobel Prize for Biochemistry could not agree on
the issues. Ordinary jurors do not possess the experience and training
necessary to make a rational decision. As Judge Wall lamented, this is
a case "in which 'common sense' simply is not enough to produce a
decision rationally related to the facts. . . ." Micro Wonder, Inc. v. Environmental Genetics Laboratories,Inc., No. 74 Civ. 007 (E.D. Kryp.
1979).
Ironically, the sophisticated scientific issues required highly educated and trained jurors, but the length of the trial prevented the empanelling of even minimally educated or trained persons. As the record
shows, the threat of a lengthy trial eliminated the most educated and
qualified jurors. The district court, recognizing the problems that long
trials impose on some jurors, excused from jury service those persons
who would have suffered great hardship from losing six months' work.
Additionally, plaintiff used all of its peremptory challenges to exclude
jurors who had college educations or technology-related jobs. Of the
one hundred potential jurors, fifty-nine had attended college. Of the
six actually chosen, only one had an education beyond high school.
One-half of the potential jurors were employed, but two-thirds of those
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chosen were not employed. After challenges and excuses, the jurors
were: a shoe salesperson, a postal clerk, an unemployed person, and
three housewives. None had technical training. The panel hardly represented either a fair cross-section of the community or a group likely
to grasp the complex matters at hand.
Yet, the jury chosen in the instant case was typical of those empanelled in complex and protracted litigation. It is unlikely that the
constitution of a new jury would be significantly different. ILC PeriOheralsLeasing Corp. v. IB.M. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D.
Cal. 1978).
ILC involved an action for monopolization of various markets in
the computer industry. In both ILC and this case, the trials took six
months, required tremendous understanding of technology, and resulted in mistrials. Likewise, in ILC the lengthy trial prevented the
empanelling of a qualified jury. United States District Court Judge
Conti explained the effect that a long trial had upon jury selection in
that case:
The 11 jurors to whom this case was submitted probably represented
a random cross-section of people in the community who could afford
to spend 10 months serving on a jury, but it is open to question
whether they were a true cross-section of the community. The six
men and five women on the jury ranged in age from 32 years to 65
years, with the majority over 50. Several of the jurors were housewives, one was retired. . . .Only one of the jurors had even limited
technical education. While the court was appreciative of the effort
they put into deciding the case, it is understandable that people with
such backgrounds would have trouble applying concepts like crosselasticity of supply and demand, . . . product interface manipulation,. . . entrepreneurial subsidiaries, subordinated debentures, .
etc. Id. at 488.
Other courts have recognized the practical inability of empanelling
qualified jurors in protracted trials. In Bernstein v. Universal Pictures,
Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court refused plaintiffs demand for a jury trial in a complex restraint of trade action after considering the complexity of the issues and the length of the trial (four
months). The Bernstein court recognized the problem of unqualified
jurors when it asked: "When persons entitled to be excused from such
a lengthy case have been eliminated from the venire, must litigants be
left with a panel consisting solely of retired people, the idle rich, those
on welfare and housewives whose children are grown?" Id. at 70. The
court concluded that the four month long trial would make it "impossible to empanel a representative jury in this case, whose verdict would
enjoy the appearance of fairness." Id. Thus, "there is a double blow to
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jury competency in protracted commercial trials: First, education and
experience are particularly necessary; second, they are unlikely to be
present." Note, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: ProtractedCommercial Litigation andthe Seventh Amendment, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 775, 786
(1978).
With the staggering depth of specialized knowledge necessary to
comprehend and discuss the intricate marvels of today's technological
advancements, it is logical that courts, in order to assure a reasoned
decision, are turning away from juries in these matters. For example,
the court in In re Boise Cascade SecuritiesLitigation, 420 F. Supp. 99,
103 (W.D. Wash. 1976), struck the plaintifis demand for a jury because
the "factual issues, the complexity of the evidence that will be required
to explore those issues, and the time required to do so leads to the conclusion that a jury would not be a rational and capable fact finder." Id.
Similarly, in In re United States FinancialSecurities Litigation, 75
F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977),' the court struck the jury demand in a
massive securities fraud action. The court emphasized that the entire
case was beyond the "practical abilities" of a jury. The court did not
believe that a jury could rationally cope with a case of such complexity.
Id. at 713.
In all of these proceedings, the courts have removed the cases from
the jury and properly placed them in equity. At least three factors militated against jury effectiveness: the composition of the jury, the conceptual sophistication of the issues, and the magnitude of the evidence.
Similarly, in the present case, these factors prevented the jury from
rendering a reasoned decision. The jurors demonstrated that they did
not understand the case by their inability to answer even one of the 105
special interrogatories. They were not able to determine the answer to
a question even so simple as whether Dr. Toohey took any item of
secret information.
The court acted properly and wisely by giving the interrogatories
to test the juror's ability to understand the exceedingly difficult concepts. Using interrogatories in conjunction with a general verdict, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 49, is an important procedural device in complex cases because the court knows precisely what the jury found. American Oil Co.
v. Hart, 356 F.2d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1966). The judge may submit as
many interrogatories as he deems necessary. Id.
Judge Wall appropriately exercised his discretion in granting the
I. After this brief was written, FinancialSecurities was reversed on appeal. 609 F.2d 411
(9th Cir. 1979).
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special interrogatories. Interrogatories are necessary to know if the
jury assimilated the information and made a reasoned decision or merely flipped a coin to reach its decision. To safeguard against an arbitrary decision, the judge sought to assure that the jury understood the
multitudinous facts. But the jury did not comprehend the issues. As
the district court judge concluded, "the issues in this action are indeed
so complicated that it is unreasonable to expect a jury to resolve
them. . . ." Micro Wonder, Inc. v. EnvironmentalGenetics Laboratories,
Inc., No. 74 Civ. 007 (E.D. Kryp. 1979).
The fact that one juror "didn't get the science stuff," another
"slept" in the afternoon, and still another relied on a feel for "personalities ' 2 likewise showed the jurors were unable to grasp the facts and
issues. These examples represent the difficulties that ordinary jurors
have in long, drawn out, complex litigation. The issues and evidence
combined to exceed the practical limitations of the jury, thus rendering
it fundamentally incompetent to resolve the litigation in a fair and reasonable manner.
Recognizing the difficulties of the information presented, En-Gen
did everything possible to aid the jury's understanding of the issues.
En-Gen employed a T-CAP team-jury education specialists-who attempted to make the complex microbiological issues comprehensible to
untrained jurors. Through the innovative use of teaching witnesses,
visual aids and summary exhibits, the team made a valiant effort to
instruct adequately the jurors. To give the six jurors every possible advantage, Judge Wall accepted En-Gen's proposals that the jury be allowed to keep notebooks, be given "interim" charges and be allowed to
review the daily transcript of testimony. Despite all of the efforts and
procedural innovations, the jury was incapable of understanding the
issues.
The only unused procedural processes, a special master, a directed
verdict, and a special verdict, would have been useless in this case. The
appointment of a special master, as allowed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(b),
would not have significantly aided the jury's understanding of the case.
A master is just another expert witness in a jury case. He cannot assist
the jury in understanding the meaning, credibility, or weight of the testimony or in resolving difficult conceptual issues. LaBuy v. Howes
Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Connecticut Importing Co. v. Frank2. Although the affidavits are not admissible to impeach the verdict, FED. R. EViD. 606(b),
we use them, as the court of appeals did, merely to show the jurors' admitted inattention during
the trial. The proof of the jurors' incompetence was displayed by a total lack of comprehension in
the courtroom.
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fort Distilleries,Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225 (D. Conn. 1940). In Bernstein, the
court held that a special master could not solve the many complex issues: "Such matters are completely unsuitable for submission to a
Master." Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 71
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). Our case is no different. The jury needed help to
make all factual findings about the state of the scientific art, the validity
of the patent, and the number of hydrocarbon degradative pathways.
Comprehensive fact-finding is not a master's function. Id. at 71.
Finally, although special verdicts and general verdicts with special
interrogatories, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 49, may reveal that a jury failed to
understand a case, see United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Brian,
337 F.2d 881, 882 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 913 (1965), both
devices can do little to increase the jury's understanding of the terms,
concepts, and actions at issue in the trial. See IB.M. Corp. v. Catamore
Enterprises,Inc., 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
960 (1977).
Clearly, a jury could not possibly function effectively in the instant
case. No jury could. Only the court is capable of trying this massive,
complex case.
C.

Only a Trial by the Bench Would Ensure a Reasoned Decision
in this Complex Case

The court is better suited to hear a complex case because the court
has better resources. In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F.
Supp. 99, 104-05 (W.D. Wash. 1976). The advantages of a bench trial
have been described by Harris & Liberman in Can the Jury Survive the
Complex Antitrust Case?, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 611 (1979). The authors state:
The judge, unlike the jury, has law clerks and secretarial staff to
help keep track of the numerous exhibits and data received. If an
aspect of a witness's [sic] testimony is unclear, the judge, unlike the
jury, can request that the witness clarify his point. The judge, unlike
the jury, can undertake continuous review and analysis of trial and
deposition transcripts. Furthermore, the court can be more flexible
in terms of manipulating trial procedures in the absence of a jury.
Issues can be tried separately. The order of proof can be rearranged.
The presentation of charts and summaries can be requested throughout the trial. Supplemental briefs and arguments, and post-trial
briefs and submissions, are available to the court upon request. And
when the trial is concluded, the trial judge can retreat into his chambers and take as much time as is necessary to prepare a reasoned
decision.
Id. at 623 (footnote omitted).
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In addition, a judge has procedural aids available to him which a
jury does not. He may request the services of a magistrate to conduct
pre-trial conferences and make findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1976)
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 53. If a point in a witness' testimony is unclear, the
judge can directly ask the witness to explain the point. A judge can
even recall witnesses on his own motion, Fed. R. Evid. 614(a), to requestion and clarify issues. Jurors, on the other hand, must sit quietly
and listen to counsel's line of questions without the ability to have their
own questions answered. The judge can devote as much time as he
needs to the study of evidence and review of arguments before deciding. If the matter is perplexing, the judge may rest or do other matters
until he is refreshed. A jury must be kept in deliberation on one case
until a decision is reached.
Trial by the bench is particularly compelling in the case at bar
because a protracted and unsuccessful jury trial has already occurred.
The courts in Bernstein, Boise Cascade, and FinancialSecurities denied
jury trials merely upon the speculation that a jury would be incompetent. After an unsuccessful trial, one court stated that, "even if one
does not want to eliminate jury trials completely in complex anti-trust
cases, then surely if the first trial results in a mistrial, the system, and
probably the parties themselves, are better served if the decision is
[made] . . . by the court." ILC PeripheralsLeasing Corp. v. I.B.M.

Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Similarly, in our case,
this Court has the actual evidence that a jury was incompetent. A mistrial has already occurred. The Court can draw upon Judge Wall's
evaluations of the six month trial and the jury's inability to comprehend the complex issues.
Ordering a new trial is inadequate to protect the parties from a
jury's inability to understand an extraordinarily complex and protracted case because retrial would almost certainly produce another
floundering jury. Also, retrial would involve a tremendous waste of the
resources of the court and the parties. Using a jury in a long and costly
case burdens the judicial system with an obvious and substantial inefficiency because the jury may be unable to decide the case. See id.
A bench trial is much more efficient. As Judge Lacey, who
decided Van Dyk Research Corp. v. Xerox Corp., No. 75-419, slip. op.
at 4559 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 1978) (transcript), explained:
While in most cases capable lawyers and a capable judge can try a
case to a jury in the same time it could be tried non-jury, there is no
question but that a complex anti-trust case, involving thousands of
documents, numerous depositions, and technical expert testimony
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about patents, refined technology and esoteric financial data, is tried
much faster by a bench than a jury trial. Depositions need not be
read into the record. Instead, they can be marked as exhibits and
submitted to the court along with each side's narrative analysis.
Lengthy exhibits can be submitted with counsel simply highlighting
appropriate portions, accompanying their submissions with a digest
of the exhibits. The testimony of numerous experts can be shortened

by submitting as exhibits their written curriculum vitae and abbreviating their testimony by introducing only so much by way of facts
and data as is necessary.
A bench trial would alleviate the unnecessary strain on the judicial
system and on the litigants as well. A second jury trial might well
bankrupt En-Gen before the substantive issues are ever heard. As the
court concluded in Railex Corp. v. Joseph Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D.
119, 125 (D.D.C. 1966), if the suit might bankrupt the defendants,
"they ought to have some voice in the matter of whether their trial is to
be by jury or by the Court." See also ILC PeripheralsLeasing Corp. v.
IB.M. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
In sum, the massive proportions of this case and the inordinately
difficult concepts involved will render any ordinary jury incompetent to
be a trier of fact. In the first trial, En-Gen was forced to present its
evidence and arguments to an uncomprehending jury. A second jury
will be no better.
A trial by jury was envisioned by the constitutional framers as a
means to promote fairness and justice. When the system acts toprevent
this fairness, a more appropriate forum must be found.
II.

THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A
JURY TRIAL WHEN A CASE IS OF SUCH
COMPLEXITY AS TO BE BEYOND THE
REASONABLE COMPREHENSION
OF ANY JURY

The seventh amendment does not require that En-Gen exhaust its
own resources and the court's in repeated and futile attempts to instruct
ordinary jurors on the intricacies of microbiological patents. That
amendment traditionally has been interpreted to preserve the right to a
jury trial in civil cases only as it existed under English common law in
1791, the year in which the seventh amendment was ratified. Atlas
Roofing Co. v. OccupationalSafety & Health Commission, 430 U.S. 442,
459 (1977).
Under the English common law of 1791, a jury would not have
been expected to try the case at bar. Instead, a case of such complexity
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and magnitude would have been removed from the jury and tried by a
judge sitting in equity.
Recent decisions by this Court have developed a flexible interpretation of the historical test which emphasizes considerations of procedural fairness, with particular attention to the capabilities of juries.
Both factors were included in this Court's most explicit consideration
of seventh amendment analysis in Ross v. Bernhard,396 U.S. 531, 538
n. 10 (1970), where the Court said: "As our cases indicate, the 'legal'
nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger
custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought;
and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries." Under the
Ross test, too, there is no right to a jury trial in the instant case because
the facts and issues are far beyond the practical limitations and capacities of any jury.
A.

Historically, Equity Granted Jurisdiction When a Case Was
Beyond the Comprehension of a Jury

The traditional method for determining whether or not the seventh
amendment required a jury trial was to apply an "historical test" to
ascertain whether the case would have been tried in law or equity
under the English common law. Baltimore & Caroline Line, Inc. v.
Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935); Dimick v. Schiedr, 293 U.S. 474, 476
(1935). It is submitted that there is no right to a jury trial in the case at
bar under the historical analysis test. Under the English common law
of 1791, a suit of comparable complexity would have been removed
from a common law jury to be heard by a judge sitting in equity.
Equity jurisdiction arose to grant relief where legal remedies were
inadequate or where the law courts worked an injustice. 1 J. Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence 211 (5th ed. 1941). These principles obviously addressed a broad spectrum of procedural inadequacies under the common law. The limits of equity jurisdiction were essentially determined
by the Lord Chancellor who, after the settlement of the EllesmereCoke quarrel in 1616, was empowered by James I to grant to parties
"such Relief in Equity (notwithstanding any Proceedings at the Common Law against them) as shall stand with the Merits and Justice of
their Cause." Arguments ProvingfromAntiquity the Dignity,Power, and
Jurisdictionof the Court of Chancery, 1 Chan. Rep. 49, 50, 21 Eng. Rep.
576, 588 (1616). This broad principle remained in force well past 1791,
and was restated in Cupit v. Jackson, M'Cle 495, 13 Price 721, 148 Eng.
Rep. 207, 211 Ex. Ch. (1824): "[In] cases, even the most unfavorable to
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equitable relief, . . . wherever the least difficulties embarrass the legal
remedies, the Courts of Equity interpose with their more effectual
forms."
The inadequacies of legal remedies largely resulted from the limitations of legal procedures themselves. "Inadequate remedy at law"
could be used in the generic sense to apply to the inability of the law
courts to entertain an action, grant an appropriate remedy or accurately
determine the facts. 1 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 31, 32 (5th ed,
1941).
Law courts were particularly inappropriate forums in which to try
complex cases. The law courts were well suited to handling the great
mass of simple litigation, but, as Mitford pointed out, "though admirably calculated for the ordinary purposes of justice, [law courts] are not
in all cases adapted to the full investigation and decision of all the intricate and complicated subjects of litigation." J. Mitford, Pleadings 2324 (4th ed. 1833). In such involved instances, equity's superior procedures could be invoked to "administer to the ends of justice, by removing impediments to a fair decision. . ." Id. at 25.
From early on, chancellors demonstrated an awareness of the inappropriate nature of jury trials in certain types of cases. One such
type of case involved jurors who were called upon to interpret complex
written documents, a subject as far removed from the common sense of
jurors then as involved treatises on advanced microbiology would be to
jurors today. Thus, in Clench v. Tomley, Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch.
1603), the chancellor refused to allow an action at common law when
the claim depended on "books and deeds, of which the Court was better able to judge then [sic] a jury of ploughmen. . . ." In a parallel
situation to the case at bar, the chancellor in Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans.
App. 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674), enjoined a proceeding at law
and took it upon himself to decide the merits when the defendants' case
depended on letters, patents, and treaties between England and Denmark. The chancellor held that it was "absurd" that "a common jury
should try whether the English have a right to trade in Iceland..
Id. at 607, 36 Eng. Rep. at 993.
Another type of case which proved impractical for jury procedures
was an action for account where a party claimed another owed him
money but did not know how much. If there were a large number of
disputed transactions between the parties, a jury would have to sit
through long and elaborate pleadings concerning each transaction. G.
Jeremy, Equity Jurisprudence 502 (1830). The chancellor, on the other
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hand, could refer the accounts to a master, who would go through the
transactions and frame the issues of dispute for a judge to review.
Therefore, equity often assumed jurisdiction over the most complex accounts on the basis of its superior procedures. Duke of Bridgewater v.
Edwards, 6 Bro. P.C. 368, 2 Eng. Rep. 1139 (H.L. 1733); Weymouth v.
Boyer, 1 Ves. Jun. 416, 30 Eng. Rep. 414 (Ch. 1792). It was also fully
within the power of the chancellor to enjoin suits at common law when
the account was too complicated for a jury to examine practically. See,
e.g., O'Connor v. Spaight, 1 Sch. & Lef. 305 (Ire. Ch. 1804).
Although the need to assert equitable jurisdiction on the ground of
jury inadequacy was rare in those simpler times, the necessity to preserve accuracy was recognized throughout the history of English law
and was eventually codified when equity and the common law were
merged under the English Judicature Act of 1873. Courts demonstrated no qualms over the historical correctness of allowing a court to
direct a trial without a jury. Thus, as pointed out in Clarke v. Cookson,
2 Ch. D. 746 (1875), such procedures were "framed expressly to meet
cases which under the oldsystem have been tried in the Chancery Division, and which might be considered . . . from great complexity, or
otherwise, not capable of being conveniently tried before a jury." Id.
at 747-48 (emphasis added). Wedderburn v. Pickering, 13 Ch. D. 769
(1879), approvingly restated the "old rule" to deny a jury trial in an
action for possession of land when the claim relied upon the interpretation of ancient deeds and conveyances. Thus, the limitation on the
right to a jury trial in complex cases under English common law existed
before, during, and after the adoption of the seventh amendment.
After 1791, American courts continued to recognize and apply the
English principle of invoking equity jurisdiction in those cases where a
jury trial would be inadequate. Thus, in Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Cai. Cas.
1 (N.Y. 1805), equity took cognizance of a case on the grounds that
"[tihe settlement of accounts, if they are in any degree long or complex,
is improper, if not impracticable, for a jury." Id. at 52. The chief justice desired to avoid confronting a jury with financial transactions
which "embraced the whole process of the adventure, from its commencement to its conclusion. . . ." d. Also, in Presidentof the Farmers'& Mechanics' Bank v. Polk, 1 Del. Ch. 167, 175 (1821), the court
held that an action for account in equity was justified on the principle
that: "These transactions are so complicated, so long and intricate, that
it is impossible for a jury to examine them with accuracy." The
Supreme Court itself recognized the historical limitations of the sev-
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enth amendment in actions for equitable accountings or otherwise in
Fowle v. Lawrason's Executor, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 495 (1831):
In all cases in which an action of account would be the proper remedy at law . . . the jurisdiction of a court of equity is undoubted
....
But in transactions not of this. . . character, great complexity
ought to exist in the accounts, or some difficulty at law should interpose. . . in order to induce a court of chancery to exercise jurisdiction.
Id. at 503. In Kirby v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Raifroad, 120
U.S. 130, 134 (1887), the Court noted the existence of equitable power
to dispense with a jury solely because of the "complicated nature of the
accounts."
The issue of whether equity granted jurisdiction in complex cases
at early common law has been thoroughly researched in a note by the
Right Honorable Lord Patrick Devlin, formerly a Lord of Appeal in
Ordinary. P. Devlin, Note on the Suit at Common Law in Englandat the
Time of the Seventh Amendment (1791).3 The conclusions of Lord Devlin's research clearly sustain En-Gen's historical analysis:
I am sure that the practical abilities and limitations of juries would
have been a factor very much in the mind of a Chancellor in 1791.
Further, if in any particular case he had thought the "practical abilities" not up to the complexities of the case, he would have had the
power to stop the suit at common law. And further, such a use of the
power would not have been considered as at all outrageous, but on
the contrary as in tune with the accepted relationship between equity
and the common law. . . . If the court denies trial by jury in any
case in which it deems the "practical abilities" to be insufficient, the
court will have history on its side.
Id. at 48, para 89.
Historically, there is no basis for the conclusion that the parties
and the courts are helplessly condemned by custom and law to try difficult issues before the one tribunal least suited to decide them.
MicroWonder's doctrinaire reliance on the seventh amendment overlooks its historic inapplicability whenever the exercise of the jury trial
right would frustrate the guarantee to a fair trial and an accurate verdict.

3. Copies of the pre-publication edition of Lord Devlin's note have been lodged with the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona in connection with Greyhound Computer
Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., No. Civ. 72-242-PHX-WPC. A copy will be furnished to the Court, on
request.
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B.

Modern Supreme Court Decisions Confirm That a Jury Trial is
Not Required When No Jury Could Adequately Review
and Understand the Issues Involved

After the adoption of the seventh amendment, the question of
whether or not a suit was tried by a jury under common law was resolved with little difficulty by applying the "historical test." With
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, marking the
merger of law and equity in the federal system, suits containing both
legal and equitable characteristics resisted classification under the
traditional historical test.
In response to this new situation, the Court has increasingly relied
on "adequacy of legal remedy" to distinguish whether or not a right to
jury trial exists. Eg., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
Specifically, the adequacy of the jury trial as a legal remedy is a vital
factor in deciding what must be tried at law to a jury and what must be
tried in equity to the court. E.g., Ross v. Bernhard,396 U.S. 531 (1970).
Modern analysis reduces reliance on outmoded pleadings and emphasizes a more practical examination of the issues. The broader view
of the distinction of law and equity was encapsulated in the third factor
of the test in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970). The
Court stated: "As our cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is
determined by considering. . . the practical abilities and limitations of
juries." The third factor in Ross reflects both the historical concern and
the post-merger considerations of procedural appropriateness. Ross
emphasizes that when a case exceeds the "practical abilities and limitations of juries,"-ie., when there is jury trial inadequacy-the seventh
amendment cannot be held to require a trial by jury.
The Ross approach was foreshadowed in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Beacon Theatres involved a suit for
injunctive relief. In substance it was a suit for damages, but in form it
was a suit for prospective relief. The Court looked to the legal substance and not the equitable form and determined that the suit was
legal and could be tried by a jury. Instead of making an historical classification based on the pleadings-ie., the prospective nature of the
relief sought-the Court invoked the traditional equitable principle
that "equity has always acted only when legal remedies were inadequate." Id. at 509. In addition to the fact that the action was historically legal in nature, the Court noted that no other "imperative
circumstances" existed to militate against a jury trial-ie., no one was
claiming that the issues involved were beyond a jury's abilities to re-
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solve. Beacon Theatres clearly indicates the Court's emphasis on procedural appropriateness at the expense of traditional historical.
assumptions.
It remained for Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), to
isolate the jury system as the key remaining distinction between legal
and equitable procedures. Faced with a claim that could be classified
as either a breach of contract for damages or an accounting in equity,
the Court refused to allow its jurisdictional determination to hinge
upon historical labels attached to pleadings. The Court again relied on
the maxim that equity jurisdiction is founded on an "absence of an
adequate remedy at law." Id. at 478. Using this analytical touchstone,
the Court stated: "[I]n order to maintain such a suit [in equity] on a
cause of action cognizable at law. . . the plaintiff must be able to show
that the 'accounts between the parties' are of such a 'complicated nature' that only a court of equity can satisfactorily unravel them." Id.,
citing Kirby v.Lake Shore & Mich.So.R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887).
Therefore, the capability of jurors to render a fair verdict was a necessary ingredient to providing an adequate remedy at law. Although the
Dairy Queen accounts were held to be well within the comprehension
of a jury, the decision expressly enunciated that the jury's ability to
"unravel" a complex case determines the boundaries of the right to demand a jury trial.
The teachings of Dairy Queen are not limited to actions for an
equitable accounting. Significantly, Ross, which followed Dairy
Queen, dropped any reference to "accounts" when it referred to the
practicality of trying issues before a jury. Ross itself did not require
resort to the jury capabilities test in order to determine whether a
shareholder's derivative suit was entitled to a jury trial. Yet, the traditionally historical analysis, which would have placed the suit in equity,
was held not to be determinative. On the contrary, Ross continued to
question the exclusive dependence on the historical method of testing
and proceeded to hold that "nothing turns now upon the form of the
action or the procedural devices by which the parties happen to come
before the court." Ross v. Bernhard,396 U.S. 531, 540 (1970).
A full discussion of all three factors of the Ross test is not necessary in most situations. This accounts for the lack of exposition of the
Ross test by this Court in cases subsequent to Ross. See, e.g., Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); Curtis v.Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 195 (1974). Itisquite proper for the courts to assume that an
otherwise "legal" controversy is within the capabilities of the jury. In
such circumstances, only an inquiry into historical precedents is neces-

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

sary. However, this does not preclude a stricter scrutiny of all three
factors of the Ross test in the infrequent circumstances of an unusually
complex case. See Hyde Propertiesv. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.
1974); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); In re United States FinancialSecuritiesLitigation, 75 F.R.D. 702
(S.D. Cal. 1977); In re Boise Cascade SecuritiesLitigation, 420 F. Supp.
99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
The jury capabilities factor of Ross would justify removing the
case at bar from a jury's consideration. Concededly, this Court in the
past had held that "mere complication of facts alone" may not justify
recourse to equity. Curriden v. Middleton, 232 U.S. 633, 636 (1914); see
also United States v. Bitter Root Development Co., 200 U.S. 451, 472
(1906). Yet, the issues in the present case go beyond "mere complication" of ordinary facts and embrace a conceptual sophistication requiring an analytical grasp beyond that possessed by the "common sense"
observer. The nature and magnitude of the documentation and the duration of the trial alone mark this case as singularly unsuited for a
jury's determination. Although equity cannot take cognizance of a case
simply because it appears to be more difficult than usual, equity can
take jurisdiction when a jury plainly would be incapable of coming to a
rational decision.
En-Gen therefore seeks relief in equity because jury procedures
have been proven inadequate to providing a fair and rational decision
in this case. Compelling En-Gen to retry its case before a jury when
the best efforts to bring the issues within the jurors' comprehension
have proven futile would extend the seventh amendment beyond its
intended scope and achieve a result contrary to its purpose.
III.

DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT TRIAL BY JURY BE
DENIED WHEN A CASE IS SO COMPLEX AS TO
EXCEED THE CAPACITY OF ANY JURY
TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES

The historical relegation of complex cases to the equity courts is
highly consistent with modem concepts of fairness in litigation. The
due process clause of the fifth amendment requires courts to adjudicate
disputes in accordance with procedures designed to assure non-arbitrary decisions. Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). Furthermore, the function of the legal process, as embodied in the
Constitution, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. Greenholtz
v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal& Correction Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13
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(1979). Together, these comments by the Court indicate that procedures of due process are intended to minimize the risk of arbitrary decisions and therefore minimize the incidence of erroneous verdicts.
The issue in the case at bar is not merely whether the jury arrived
at a correct verdict, but, of equal importance, whether the decision was
arrived at in a fair manner. A case presenting a fact situation of such
complexity as to be incomprehensible to a jury risks both an arbitrary
and an erroneous result.
The due process right to a competent tribunal is quite separate
from the right to any particularform ofproceeding. Peters v. Kff,407
U.S. 493, 501 (1972). This suggests that the right to a jury trial must be
modified, in unusual circumstances, by the greater right to a fair and
competent tribunal.
No constitutional provision exists in an utter vacuum. At some
point, the strictest and firmest presumptions of our judicial system must
give way to a sufficiently compelling counter-concern. Even if one
could say that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to a trial by jury,
there still remains the countervailing constitutional right of the defendant to a fair trial. Furthermore, even if the plaintifis hypothetical right
to a jury trial bore a heavy presumption, such a presumption can be
overcome when it conflicts with the most basic tenet of our judicial
system. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), this Court stated that
"it is of the utmost importance that the administration of justice be absolutelyfair and orderly." Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
Particularly in the area of first amendment rights, this Court has
recognized that one important right can conflict with an even more fundamental second right. A very special solicitude has always been accorded by the courts to first amendment rights. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 568 (1972). Nevertheless, "accommodations between
[first amendment rights and due process property rights] are sometimes
necessary. . . ." Id. at 567-68. In Rowan v. United States Post Office
Department, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970), this Court stated that "the right
of every person 'to be let alone' must be placed on the scales with the
right of others to communicate." Similarly, it was recognized in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976), that although barriers to the imposition of prior restraints remain high, they
could be outweighed by defendant's right to a fair trial. Cf.Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (contrasting
plaintiff's right to his professional property with the press' first amendment privileges); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (balancing
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the President's constitutional privilege against a defendant's right to a
fair trial); Breardv. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644 (1951) ("balancing of
the conveniences between some householders' desire for privacy
and the publisher's right to distribute publications. . . ."); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (comparing one's right to free speech
via use of a loudspeaker against others' privacy rights). In addition, the
Supreme Court has never hesitated to use the flexible concepts of due
process to imply limitations to constitutional powers of government.
See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-74 (1969) (Congress'
power to prescribe rules for the military construed in light of the fifth
amendment); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164 (1963)
(war and foreign relations powers subject to due process); Secretary of
Agriculture v. CentralRoig Rening Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616 (1950) (commerce power subject to due process).
It is particularly appropriate to modify a seventh amendment right
to a jury trial in circumstances such as these because the jury was originally conceived to prevent arbitrary decisions by the sovereign. ILC
PeripheralsLeasing Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 448 (N.D.
Cal. 1978). In deciding that a highly complex case warranted the denial of a jury trial, the 1LC court noted that: "It would be a subversion
of [the seventh amendment] ideal to insist upon. . . a jury when there
is a substantial risk that its decision will be arbitrary." Id. at 448-49.
In other words, at the point where the seventh amendment no longer
serves the purpose for which it was created, and indeed would create a
result contrary to its purpose, then any seventh amendment presumption in favor of a jury trial must be modified.
Other courts have denied a jury trial in circumstances where the
jury was unlikely to produce a just and fair result. The complex situation in Bernstein v. UniversalPictures,Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 71 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), prompted the court to state "to hold that a jury trial is required
in this case would be to hold that the Seventh Amendment gives a single party at its choice the right to an irrational verdict." Similarly, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied a jury trial
in a complex interpleader action because "a non-jury trial of the issues
is both more efficient and more likely to produce a just result." Hyde
Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added).
The court in In re Boise Cascade SecuritiesLitigation, 420 F. Supp.
99 (W.D. Wash. 1976), was particularly sensitive to the issue of fairness
to the parties. That case involved a securities fraud action brought by
former stockholders of a company. Assets and liabilities in excess of a
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billion dollars in transactions over a period of five years were involved
in the case. In denying a jury trial that would otherwise be granted but
for the great complexity of the case, the court stated:
The procedural safeguards inherent in our legal system provide the
impression and fact of fairness to the litigants. . . . Indeed, under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the legitimacy of government action is measured in terms of fairness.
Central to the fairness which must attend the resolution of a
civil action is an impartial and capable fact finder. . . . [A]t some
point, it must be recognized that the complexity of a case may exceed
the ability of a jury to decide the facts in an informed and capable
manner. When that occurs, the question arises as to whether the
right and necessity of fairness is defeated by relegating fact finding to
a body not qualified to determine the facts. The third part of the
analysis in footnote 10 [of Ross] directly recognizes this.
Id. at 104 (citation omitted). Even if a strictly historical analysis of the
seventh amendment were to suggest that a jury trial is required, this
argument should not prevail when a jury would be so incapable of
comprehending the facts that an unfair and arbitrary decision is virtually certain.
Several analogies justify the proposition that a jury trial constitutionally can be denied. By statute, jurors must be able to understand
English and minors are not permitted to be jurors. 28 U.S.C. § 1865
(1976). Moreover, insane people cannot serve on juries. Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 169, 176 (1912). The clear intent of these requirements is to bar people who cannot properly comprehend the facts,
issues, and law of a case.
A person who cannot understand English, or who is not fully competent due to minority or insanity, should not be allowed to make a
decision that can deprive a person of his life, liberty, or property. However, the underlying concepts of this case are of such immense difficulty
that jurors are in the same position as one who does not understand the
language or is incompetent.
Excerpts from the scientific journals are indicative of the immensely technical concepts necessary for an understanding of this case.
Such concepts, presented over ninety-six days of trial, among
thousands of documents and other evidence, were the equivalent of a
foreign language to the harried and little-educated jurors. Only a judge
who, among many other aids, may constantly question witnesses and
who may periodically order breaks in the trial in order to assimilate the
evidence, would have any chance of coherently understanding the facts
of the case.
The directed verdict is a further analogy to the permissibility of

936

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

denying a jury trial in highly complex cases. Where the evidence in a
case allows for only one reasonable interpretation, so that the jury deliberations would serve no purpose, the case can be taken from the jury.
The constitutionality of the directed verdict which results was upheld
by the Court in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943). By
similar reasoning, if the jury cannot perform its function, then its deliberations serve no purpose and the case should be taken from the jury.
See Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92
Harv. L. Rev. 898, 910 (1979). Since there is no constitutional barrier
in taking a case from the jury in the above situations, there should be
no constitutional problem in denying a jury when it was utterly unable
to perform its function. It is for this reason that the third factor of the
Ross test, practical limitations and abilities of jurors, has been held to
be of constitutional proportions. See In re Boise CascadeSecurities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
In the case at bar, the jury clearly made a decision without comprehending the underlying facts. The jury was not able to answer a
single one of 105 interrogatories. The questions, such as the "obviousness" of the invention, the dates of conception, and the biological
compositions of the inventions, were basic to a rational and properly
conceived verdict. As the distinguished Chief Judge of the Twelfth
Circuit noted, jurors who sleep every afternoon or who rely on a feel
for the personalities cannot be expected to be applying a logical analysis in deciding the case. MicroWonder, Inc. v. Environmental Genetics
Laboratories,Inc., No. 79-1791 (12th Cir. 1979). The trial judge, who
carefully witnessed all of the proceedings, specifically noted that it was
unreasonable for a jury to resolve the issues. Micro Wonder, Inc. v. Environmental Genetics Laboratories,Inc., 74 Civ. 007 (E.D. Kryp. 1979).
Indeed, the trial judge felt that even he would be unable to properly
decide the case without the extra aids available to the court.
The jury in the case at bar was faced with a monumental task.
First, the case was quite complicated from the standpoint of sheer numbers of witnesses, documents, depositions, and other evidence. Second,
the jury was required to comprehend various aspects of patent law and
other legal concepts. In addition to these considerable problems, the
jury was faced with numerous difficult and highly technical scientific
concepts. Such an overwhelming load is beyond the capabilities of any
ury.
There can be no doubt that a jury trial is the appropriate vehicle
for the vast majority of cases that would traditionally be considered
legal. But the courts should not hesitate to deny a jury trial in that tiny
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minority of cases that are of such immense complexity that a jury could
not come to a meaningful verdict. The due process clause of the fifth
amendment mandates the denial of a jury in such a situation.
For the reasons above, respondent prays that the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit be affirmed in
its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
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RICHARD M. KARR
DAMON

PAMELA

H. WOLDOW

MOOT COURT SOCIETY
CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW

ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

APPENDIX
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const. amend V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. Const. amend VII:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
FEDERAL STATUTES

28 U.S.C § 636 (1976):
§ 636. Jurisdiction, powers, and temporary assignment
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary
(A) a judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine
any pretrial matter pending before the court . ...
(B) a judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the
court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph
(A), of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals convicted
of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions challenging conditions
of confinement.
(C) the magistrate shall file his proposed findings and recommendations under subparagraph (B) with the court and a copy shall
forthwith be mailed to all parties.

28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1976):
§ 1865. Qualifications for jury service
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(b) In making such determination the chief judge of the district
court, or such other district court judge as the plan may provide,
shall deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries in
the district court unless he(1) is not a citizen of the United States eighteen years
old who has resided for a period of one year within the judicial district;
(2) is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill
out satisfactorily the juror qualification form;
(3) is unable to speak the English language;
(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service; ....
FEDERAL RULES

Fed R. Civ. P. 39(a):
Rule 39.
TRIAL BY JURY OR BY THE COURT
(a) By Jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the docket as a
jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury,
unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court
and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without
a jury or (2) the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a
right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist
under the Constitution or statutes of the United States.
Fed

.

i. P . 49:

Rule 49.
SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES
(a) Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury to return
only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon
each issue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury
written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or
may submit written forms of the several special findings which might
properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use
such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written
findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give
to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter
thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its
findings upon each issue. ...
(b) General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories. The court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate
forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more
issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. The
court shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary
to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to
render the general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to
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make written answers and to render the general verdict. When the
general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate
judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58. When the answers are consistent with each other but one or
more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58 in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury for
further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new
trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or
more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall
not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial.
As amended Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963.
Fed R. Ci. P. 53:
Rule 53.
MASTERS
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception
and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be
made only when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried
without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that
some exceptional condition requires it.
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may specify
or limit his powers and may direct him to report only upon particular
issues or to do or perform particular acts or to receive and report
evidence only and may fix the time and place for beginning and closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's report. Subject to
the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the master has
and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every
hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary
or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order.
He may require the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in the reference, including the production of all books,
papers, vouchers, documents, and writings applicable thereto. He
may rule upon the admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed
by the order of reference and has the authority to put witnesses on
oath and may himself examine them and may call the parties to the
action and examine them upon oath. When a party so requests, the
master shall make a record of the evidence offered and excluded in
the same manner and subject to the same limitations as provided in
Rule 43(c) for a court sitting without a jury.
(e)

Report.

(2) In Non-jury Actions. In an action to be tried without a jury
the court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Within 10 days after being served with notice of the filing of
the report any party may serve written objections thereto upon the
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other parties. Application to the court for action upon the report and
upon objections thereto shall be by motion and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6(d). The court after hearing may adopt the report or
may modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or may receive
further evidence or may recommit it with instructions.
(3) In Jury Actions. In an action to be tried by a jury the
master shall not be directed to report the evidence. His findings
upon the issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the
matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling of
the court upon any objections in point of law which may be made to
the report.
As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.
Fed R. Evid 606(b):
Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment-Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on
the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his
affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter
about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for
these purposes.
Pub. L. 93-595, § 1, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1934.
Fed R. Evid 614(a):
Rule 614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court
(a) Calling by court-The court may, on its own motion or at
the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to
cross-examine witnesses thus called.
Pub. L. 93-595, § 1, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1934.
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